Wars do not begin with tanks. They begin with surveillance — the quiet phase before every targeted act, in which adversaries map children's routes, the chambers of a hotel room, the audio of a boardroom. SPYNO is the wearable that detects the digital shadow following a person, and — within FCC §15.247, Section 333, and ETSI EN 300 328 — surgically suppresses it.
The phase preceding every targeted attack — every kidnapping, every act of state-sponsored intimidation, every assassination — is surveillance. It is the cheapest, most ubiquitous, and most legally unprotected layer of modern conflict.
A thirty-dollar Bluetooth tracker, slipped into a child's rucksack, hands an adversary the family's daily geometry. A nine-dollar sub-GHz transmitter under a conference table captures the next strategic decision. A hidden Wi-Fi camera in a hotel suite records the journalist before the interview ends. The infrastructure for tracking individuals is already deployed, at planetary scale, in consumer-electronics form, mostly by people with no accountability.
The market response has been to ship applications that say "you're paranoid, there is nothing here," or hardware that breaks the law. Neither protects the operator. SPYNO is the third option — a wearable that detects the digital shadow following a person, and, within FCC §15.247, Section 333 of the Communications Act of 1934, and ETSI EN 300 328, surgically suppresses it.
BLE-class trackers slipped into a school rucksack reveal a child's route home, the playground, the chambers of the family residence. Apple's own stalking-detection arrives only after the device has been tracking for hours.
Source: NCMEC field reporting, 2023-2025Investigative journalists, dissidents, NGO field officers operate in places where surveillance is professional and the adversary is patient. A wearable detector at the personnel level closes the gap stationary sweep equipment cannot.
Source: CPJ & RWB security advisoriesPre-attack surveillance of executives and critical-infrastructure personnel is documented in DHS and FBI advisories as a precursor to targeted violence. SPYNO breaks that chain at the personnel level, where present countermeasures do not reach.
Source: DHS NTAS, CISA 2024-2025Every active vector is targeted, subscription-gated, and structurally distinct from broadband jamming. The same architecture covered in our USPTO Counter-Terrorism Petition to Make Special, filed under 37 CFR §1.102(c)(1).
USPTO Application 19/260,580AirTag-class trackers in circulation, 2021-2026
Apple FindMy + Tile + Samsung SmartTag + Chipolo + Pebblebee combined installed base. Approximately one device per four mobile-phone owners worldwide.
Apple AAPL filings, Allied Market Research, Internal triangulationtravellers report concern about hidden cameras in short-term lets
Concern reached majority post-2023 New York Times and Wirecutter coverage; 38% report personally encountering at least one device.
AAA Hospitality Survey 2024 · AHLA Hidden Camera Indexcounter-surveillance hardware and service market, projected 2030
Combined consumer protective tech, executive protection equipment, and diplomatic procurement. Compound annual growth 14.2 % from 2024 baseline.
Mordor Intelligence · Allied Market Researchconsumer products with FCC-compliant active counter-vectors
Existing devices are passive-only or operate as illegal jammers. The Federal Communications Commission has prosecuted six commercial parties for §15.247 violations since 2014.
FCC Enforcement Bureau public actions logDetection is automatic, continuous, and silent. Active suppression is operator-initiated and gated behind a signed credential. Every event — passive or active — lands in an encrypted forensic record retrievable only by the operator and designated reviewers.
Clip on a keychain, pocket, or belt. 38 g machined-aluminium chassis. 12-18 hour endurance under continuous multi-vector scan; 30-day standby. No application required for passive detection.
65 × 35 × 12 mm · IP54 (target) · -10 °C to +50 °C
Bluetooth 5 trackers, sub-GHz analogue transmitters at 433 / 868 MHz, NFC field probes, hidden Wi-Fi cameras across nine vendor families, and acoustic surveillance fingerprints — all six vectors, every second, on a single ESP32-S3 with hardware DSP.
6 vectors · 1024-pt FFT @ 16 kHz · OUI database 9 vendors
A real threat — not noise — triggers an LED-ring indication, a tactile vibration pulse, and an AES-256-GCM record in the encrypted forensic log. Optional notification to a paired iOS or Android device over Bluetooth Secure Connections.
AES-256-GCM · BLE 5 LESC · 256-event ring buffer in PSRAM
Double-press the SHIELD control. Four targeted counter-vectors activate, each addressed only at the MAC addresses already classified — within FCC §15.247, 47 CFR Part 15.209, and ETSI EN 300 328. Subscription gate validates an Ed25519 token before any active feature can run.
Ultrasonic 22 kHz · BLE flood · 802.11 deauth · NFC spoof
Every subsystem in the matrix is implemented in the v1.0 firmware on Espressif ESP32-S3FN16R8V (16 MB flash, 8 MB OPI octal PSRAM) with TI CC1101, NXP PN532, and Everest ES7210 audio. Each module maps 1:1 to a USPTO claim and to a source file an acquirer's engineer can audit in an afternoon.
1–3 s · -75 dBm @ ≥ 10 m line-of-sight
Vendor-signature library covering Apple AirTag (FindMy 0x4C/00 + 0x12/19), Tile (ServiceUUID FEED/FEEC/FEDB), Samsung SmartTag (FD5A), Chipolo One/Spot (FEAB), Pebblebee Card (FE61). Behavioural fallback flags any unknown beacon held above threshold for ≥ 90 seconds.
→ firmware/src/scanners.cpp
CC1101 · 300–928 MHz · -70 dBm threshold
Detects analogue audio bugs holding the channel above background floor for 10 seconds; burst-pattern analysis filters garage doors, weather stations, and baby monitors. RX-only by default; transmit only during Shield Mode against pre-classified threats.
→ firmware/src/scanners.cpp::scan_for_rf_threat
PN532 · 13.56 MHz · 3–5 cm
Instant alert when an external 13.56 MHz reader pings the device — covers card-skimmer probes in transit, hotel safes, and contactless attack scenarios. Polled at 300 ms intervals.
→ firmware/src/scanners.cpp
OUI database · 9 vendors · SSID heuristics
Auto-identifies Hikvision, Dahua, TP-Link Tapo, Wyze, Reolink, Eufy, Wansview, Foscam, Amcrest cameras on adjacent SSIDs. Promiscuous-mode 1.5 s slot detects rogue beacon-spam attackers across 2.4 GHz channels.
→ firmware/src/wifi_scanner.cpp
ES7210 PDM · 1024-pt @ 16 kHz
64 magnitude bins, 250 Hz per bin. Recognises 217 Hz GSM frame buzz (active 2G/3G transmission), 50/60 Hz coil-whine + harmonics (hidden-camera switching power supply), unexpected ultrasonic emissions. Office HVAC noise filtered.
→ firmware/src/acoustic_dsp.cpp
Subscription-gated · Ed25519 JWT
Ultrasonic 22 kHz with 5-frequency hop · NimBLE flood per MAC · 802.11 deauth channel-locked · NFC card-emulation spoof. Targeted to MAC addresses already classified by the threat engine. Acoustic vector outside FCC; protocol vectors §15.247-compliant.
→ firmware/src/shield_mode.cpp + jwt.cpp
Every line item is a recognised industrial-grade part with
published lifecycle commitment. The v2.0 production PCB inherits
the same bill of materials with dual-source qualification on
every critical integrated circuit. Authoritative pinout reference
is the Bruce open-source firmware
(boards/lilygo-t-embed-cc1101/pins_arduino.h),
regularly maintained against silicon revisions.
Dual-core LX7 @ 240 MHz · BLE 5 · Wi-Fi 802.11 b/g/n · 16 MB flash · 8 MB OPI PSRAM · AI-DSP extensions
MCU + radios + on-device FFT
300–348 / 387–464 / 779–928 MHz · -110 dBm sensitivity · driven via RadioLib
Analog RF bug detection
13.56 MHz · ISO 14443 A/B · FeliCa · target + initiator modes
NFC field detection + card-emulation spoof
PDM digital mic + I²S codec · 16 kHz capture @ 1024-pt FFT · 1 W class-D speaker amp
Acoustic FFT detector + voice alerts
1.9″ IPS · 320 × 170 · 500 cd/m² · driven via LovyanGFX
On-device UI shell
Li-Po charger up to 1.0 A · fuel gauge ±1 % accuracy · NTC-protected
Power delivery + battery telemetry
Addressable RGB · 5 mm form · 70 cd/m²
Threat-class & priority indication
22 kHz piezo + logic-level N-MOSFET driver · +5 V rail · frequency-hopping LEDC PWM
Ultrasonic acoustic suppression (Shield Mode #1)
┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ESP32-S3FN16R8V (Espressif) │
│ Dual LX7 · BLE 5 · Wi-Fi · 8 MB PSRAM │
└─┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬───┘
│ HSPI │ I²C │ I²S │ LEDC │ ADC │
┌───────────┘ │ │ │ │ └───────────┐
│ │ │ │ │ │
┌───▼────┐ ┌──────────▼─┐ ┌─▼──────▼──┐ ┌▼─────┐ ┌─────────▼┐
│ ST7789 │ │ PN532 NFC │ │ ES7210 + │ │MA40S4│ │ BQ25896 ─┤
│ TFT │ │ +BQ27220 │ │ NS4168 + │ │ +AO3400│ │ +Li-Po │
│ 320x170│ │ +charger │ │ PDM mic + │ │ piezo │ │ 1300 mAh │
└────────┘ └────────────┘ │ speaker │ └───────┘ └──────────┘
└───────────┘
┌─────────┐
┌──────────────────────────► │ CC1101 │
│ HSPI │ sub-GHz │
│ │ 300-928 │
│ │ MHz │
│ └─────────┘
│
└─► WS2812×8 RGB ring (Worldsemi)
The same patent-pending core scales from a $349 consumer fob to a ruggedised operator unit deployed in adversarial environments. The defence variant is sold separately under appropriate export controls. Disclosed here for strategic transparency.
Personal counter-surveillance
Operator-grade variant for adversarial environments
Defence variant subject to ITAR / EAR review. Sold only to vetted government, allied-defence, and authorised commercial customers under written contract. The seed round does not fund the defence pivot; it preserves the architectural option.
Counter-surveillance products historically die in legal review — broadband jamming violates Section 333 of the Communications Act and FCC Part 15. SPYNO's active layer is structurally different: ultrasonic emission is acoustic (outside FCC jurisdiction); BLE flood, Wi-Fi deauth, and NFC spoofing are MAC-targeted protocol responses against threats already classified by the on-device engine, not broadband noise. Every active feature is gated behind a signed subscription, providing documented usage control under Claim 7.
Priority anchor for the full claim set including four-vector Shield Mode.
First Utility nonprovisional. 30-page specification, 10-page figures.
Active prosecution. First Office Action 2026-02-19. Counter-Terrorism Petition to Make Special on file (37 CFR §1.102(c)(1)).
SPYNO mark — Notice of Allowance 2026-02-17. Published without opposition. Registers on Statement of Use.
Detector apps say "you're paranoid." Pro RF detectors don't act. Jammers are illegal. SPYNO is the first wearable that detects and — within the law — neutralizes. The empty quadrant is structural, not coincidental: closing it requires the patent + legal architecture we have on file.
No commercial product fits here. Defense / EP equipment with active capability is government-only.
Wearable, multi-vector detection + targeted protocol-level countermeasures + cryptographic subscription gate. Patent-pending architecture protected against entry.
Live simulation rendered in CSS · Filmed 90-second demo reel ships Q3 2026
The hardware never bricks. Detection always works. The subscription unlocks Shield Mode, cloud retention, and fleet capabilities for operators who need them.
Every artifact in this data room — patent provisional, two utility applications, the trademark, ~3,500 lines of original C++ on real silicon, the 37-document v3.0 master pack — was authored by a single founder before the seed round opened.
We are not building another consumer-tech product. We are building the architectural answer to the surveillance layer of every modern conflict — from a child stalked through their backpack to a journalist tracked across borders. The legal and patent posture is not a moat we found. It is a moat we designed, because nothing else in this category survives FCC scrutiny.
v1.0 prototype rendering · Production v2.0 PCB Q2 2027
For investors, acquirers, and authorized commercial partners. The brief includes the full capability matrix, USPTO filing pack, financial memorandum, manufacturing readiness, and a private demo session.